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1. — INTRODUCTION 
A firm wishing to protect its intellectual property from imitation has diffe
rent options, notably patents, first mover advantage, lead time and secrecy. 
Although patents are often thought to be less effective at enabling the inventor 
to benefit from the innovation than other alternatives (Levin et al., 1987 ; 
Cohen et al., 1996), they have an important socially valuable feature that the 
alternatives lack. Specifically, patents can be used to sell technology, typically 
through licensing contracts. 
This is our point of departure beyond the traditional approach to patents that 
has mainly focused on patents as means to exclude others. Simply put, patents 
can play a key role in facilitating the purchase and sale of technology, or in 
other words, the development and functioning of a market for technology. A 
market for technology helps diffuse existing technology more efficiently ; it 
also enables firms to specialize in the generation of new technology. In turn, 
such specialization is likely to hasten the pace of technological change itself. 
The reason for focusing on the development and functioning of a market for 
(*) Financial support from the The European Commission throught the TSER program, 
contact SOE1-CT97-1059, is gratefully acknowledged. We are indebted to Alfonso 
Gambardella for ongoing suggestions and discussions. We thank Eric Brousseau, an ano
nymous referee of this journal and participants in seminars at Stanford University, 
University of Stuttgart and University Carlos III (Madrid) for helpful comments on a pre
vious draft. Ralph Landau and Martin Howard have shared their extensive knowledge of 
licensing practices in the chemical industry, for which we are very grateful. All errors, of 
course, remain our own. 
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technology is that it greatly reduces the transaction costs involved in buying 
and selling technology, implying that innovators have the option of appropria-
ting the rents from their innovatÍon by means of simple contracts, instead of 
having to exploit the technology in-house. 
However, the development of a market for technology is not an automatic 
outcome. It depends not only on the efficacy of technology licensing contracts 
(and on the strength of patents that underpin these contracts), but also on the 
industry structure itself. This is an important issue - Whether firms contract for 
technology depends not only on the transaction costs, as commonly unders-
tood, but al so on historical factors. Thus, in chemicals, the presence of specia-
lized engineering firms that licensed technology, and in other cases, provided 
complementary know-how for technologies developed by chemical firms 
played a key role. The increasing competition has also fostered the willingness 
of even the largest chemical firms to license their technology, while globaliza-
tion and entry since world war 11 has meant that there exists a substantial num-
ber of chemical producers that are potential buyers of technology. 
The chemical industry provides a natural framework within which to explore 
these themes. It is a technology-based industry with a long history of patenting 
and licensing. Further, as we show, transactions in technology have become 
widespread, with substantial variations across products. 
The next section reviews the contribution of the economics literature on the 
role of patents in fostering innovation and facilitating the diffusion of techno-
logy. In section 3 we show how, in the past, chemical firms have used patents 
as one of the ways of excluding competitors and creating monopolies. 
However, after world war 11 firms started to use licensing contracts (underpin-
ned by patents) as means to profit from innovation, leading to the development 
of a market for chemical process technology. As section 4 argues, patents have 
al so facilitated the entry of specialized engineering firms and a progressive 
division of labor. Furthermore, as discussed in section 5, this has profoundly 
influenced how even large chemical producers appropriate rents from their 
innovations. Section 6 discusses the specific features of the chemical industry 
that have favored the creation of a market for technology. Section 7 summa-
rizes and concludes the paper. 
2. - PATENTS, INNOVATION, AND DIFFUSION 
Much of the early economics literature on patents focused upon the trade-off 
between the social inefficiency due to monopoly and the social benefits from 
the innovation. ImplicitIy, a one-to-one relationship was assumed between a 
patent and an innovation. Although analyticalIy convenient, this assumption 
obscured the point that in technologies that are cumulative or systemic, an 
innovation may require many different pieces of knowledge, sorne of which 
may be patented and owned by agents with conflicting interests. 
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With cumulative and systemic technoJogies, an agent holding a patent on an 
important component may cause severe « holdup » problems, retarding the 
development of the technology (e.g. Scotchmer, 1991 ; Green and Scotchmer, 
1995). In a similar vein, Merges and Nelson (1990, 1993) argue that broad 
patents increase the likelihood that an innovator would try to control future 
innovations based upon its own innovation, thereby slowing down the pace of 
technological progress. 
However, the essential problem is not caused by patents, but by factors (such 
as negotiation costs) that prevent agents from entering into contracts for the use 
of patents. Thus the issue at stake is the impact that better defined patent rights 
would have on transaction costs. In a more recent paper, Merges (1998) uses 
the incomplete contracting approach (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and 
Moore, 1990) to argue that well defined patents reduce transaction costs, and 
thereby help increase transactions in technology. As the examples of techno-
logy sharing agreements in the chemical industry, discussed below, show, 
patents play an important role in structuring complex contracts involving the 
exchange of technology between large firms (1). 
Efficient contracting for technology is particularly important because inno-
vations may systematically originate in firms that will not develop and utilize 
the knowledge themselves. Instead, a division of labor in innovative activity 
can exist, whereby innovations are transferred to other firms that develop and 
commercialize them further (Arora and Gambardella, 1994). Patents can play 
an important role in determining the efficiency of knowledge flows, which are 
critical to any knowledge-based division of labor. 
This neglect of the possibility of saje of technology is rooted partly in the 
well-known fact that licensing contracts in the past have tended to be imper-
fect. As a result, innovators have been unable to appropriate a substantial share 
of the rents from the innovation (e.g. Arrow, 1962 ; Caves et al., 1983). 
The tacitness, or more precisely, the inarticulable aspect of technology, is 
undoubtedly an important part of the reason why licensing is sometimes not an 
efficient way to appropriate rents from innovation. Many standard economic 
models of innovation have implicitly assumed that all useful technological 
knowledge, once produced is costJessly transmittable. In the vast majority of 
cases, this is simply untrue. In practice, much of the useful knowledge is not 
codified in the form of patents and blueprints (2). Often, the innovator has 
(1) This is not specific lo the chemical industry. Grindley and Tcece (1997) report that. in 
cross-Iícensíng agreements in electronics and semiconductors. the quality and the markel 
coverage of the patent portfolios of each party is used in the calculation of balancing 
royalty payments. See also Hall and Ham (1999). 
(2) Over two thirds of the British firms interviewed by Taylor and Silberston (1973) said that 
know-how transfer was the main, or one of the main motives. behind their patent Iicensing 
agreements. 
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sorne discretion in how she codifies, stores, and organizes this information. 
Strong patent protection provides incentives to codify new knowledge in ways 
that are meaningful and useful to others. 
Moreover, to the extent that the tacitness of technology raises problems for 
the efficiency of contracts for knowledge, patent protection also directly affects 
the efficiency of the contracting process itself (Arora, 1995). Specifically, taCÍt 
technology is transferred as know-how, but contracts for know-how are typi-
calIy believed to be highly imperfect (Teece, 1988). Arora (1995) shows that as 
long as patent scope is sufficiently broad, one can write fair1y simple contracts 
for the exchange of technologies and related know-how. These contracts 
involve payments over time to provide incentives for the licensor to transfer 
know-how, while the patents the licensor holds prevent the licensee from beha-
ving opportunistically. In particular, the stronger the patent protection, the 
lower the licensee's payoff from reneging on the contract and « inventing 
around » the licensor's technology. Thus Arora (1995) finds that the efficiency 
of technology licensing contracts in terms of transfer of know-how is greater, 
the stronger is the patent protection that the licensor enjoys. 
In the technology licensing agreements discussed below, the vast majority are 
contracts that involve the transfer of know-how and unpatented technology. 
However, for the most part, these contracts are underpinned by patents. 
Industry executives we interviewed strongly believe that strong patent protec-
tion is vital for technology licensing and that absent such protection, firms 
would drastically reduce the extent of technology licensing. 
3. - THE MARKET FOR TECHNOLOGY IN CHEMICALS 
The way in which patents have been used in the chemical industry has evolved 
over time. Patents played an important role in the development of organic dyes-
tuffs, the first major product area of the modero organic chemical industry, in the 
1 850s and 60s. Chemical technologies, strongly based in science, were easier to 
codify and patent compared to mechanical technologies. The properties of syn-
thetic dyes were dependent heavily on the structure of the molecules. Thus, 
understanding the structure of the dyestuff molecule and how to produce them 
implied that the innovator could protect the innovation through patents. German 
companies skillfully combined secrecy and patents to exclude competitors, both 
at home and abroad (see Arora, 1997, for a full discussion). 
Domestic licensing was not common during this time because the dominant 
producers also controlled technology, not because of problems in technology 
licensing. Instead, the dominant producers in each market tended to form licen-
sing and market sharing agreements with each other to keep out entrants. 
Indeed, the pre-WWII international chemical market has been characterized by 
many as a sort of a « gentlemen's club» (e.g. Spitz, 1988 ; Smith, 1992). These 
cartels used a number of instruments, including patent licensing agreements, to 
maintain market shares and deter entry. 
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Sorne cartels were organized around a common technology, and were often 
initiated by the patent holder. The patent would be licensed, often in retum for 
an equity stake, with technology flow-back agreements. For instance, the 
Solvay process licensees were required to share all improvements with the 
Solvay company, and the latter would share it with other licensees. To the 
extent that there were benefits to alllicensees from having the Solvay process 
become the standard process for the production of alkali, such technology sha-
ring cartels were mutually beneficial. In other cases, particularly during the 
1920s and 1930s, there were sorne prominent technology and market sharing 
agreements, with the agreement between Standard and IG Farben that involved 
technology sharing in butyl rubber, TEL and arc acetylene (from Standard), 
and Buna S (from IG Farben) being one of the best known examples. 
Though anti-competitive in intent, these arrangements did economize on 
scarce assets. For instance, although ICI obtained the basic patent on polyester, 
Du Pont had developed significant expertise in the production process based on 
its experience in nylon, and controHed the melt-spinning process that was cru-
cial for successful commercialization. ICI and Du Pont had a long standing 
agreement that involved technology lícensing as well as the extensive sharing 
of informatíon and know-how. As a result, the two companies quickly settled 
on a suitable cross-licensing agreement. 
However, it is only after world war 11 that firms start to use licensing as a 
means to profit from innovation and a market for chemical technology begíns 
to arise. Indeed, starting from the 1950s an increasing number of chemical pro-
cesses became available for license. Landau (1966 :4) wríting two decades 
after the end of the war, noted that « ... the partíal breakdown of secrecy barriers 
in the chemical industry is increasing ... the trend toward more licensing of pro-
cesses ... ». Importantly, these were not exclusive licenses. As Spitz (1988 : 318) 
put it « ... sorne brand new technologies, developed by operating (chemical) 
companies, were made available for 1¡cense to any and all comers. A good 
example is the Hercules-Distillers phenollacetone process, which was com-
mercialized in 1953 and forever changed the way that phenol would be produ-
ced ... ». 
Our data analysis confirms the presence of a well-established market for che-
mica1 technology during the 1980s (3). Indeed, Figure 1 shows that during the 
period under study only a fifth of the technology used in new chemical invest-
ments worldwide was developed in-house by the investors, while the rest was 
licensed in from unaffiliated sources. In monetary terms, we estimate that the 
(3) AI1 figures reported in this essay refer to our caIculations of Chemical Age Project File 
(CAPF), a comprehensive data set on worldwide investments in chemical plants during the 
1980s, compiled by Pergamon Press, London. The data set covers about 14,000 plants 
constructed or under construction during the period 1980-90. CAPF discloses the infor-
mation about the licensor only in haJf of the plants. Most of the figures provided in this 
paper are based on the assumption that the blanks are selected randomJy. 
REVUE D'ÉCONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE - n° 92, 2@ et 3e trimestres 2000 321 
average annual value of the transactions in this market was between $ 1 O and 
$20 billion (4). To put this in perspective, in 1986 the total R&D spending of 
the largest 30 US chemical firms was below $8 billion (Arora and 
Gambardella, 1998). 
FIGURE 1 : Who was licensing chemical technologies during the 1980s 
m SEFs 
.in-house 
D chemical 
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However, there are important differences across geographic areas, chemical 
sub-sectors and investors' sizes and nationalities in the propensity of chemical 
producers to reIy on the market for technoIogy. Firms investing in North 
America (Canada and USA) have the highest share of pIants deveIoped in-
house (more than 40 %), closely followed by firms investing in Western 
Europe. This share is the smallest for firms in Eastem Europe, Africa, Middle 
East and South America (less than 5 %). Multinational firms tend to rely more 
on in-house technology although this share is still sensitive to the final Iocation 
of the investment. Size and nationaIity of the investors, which might proxy for 
the degree of technological capability, seem to play an important role. Large 
chemicaI corporations from advanced countries acquire Iess than 50 % of their 
technoIogy from unaffiliated sources. By contrast, third world firms reIy almost 
compIetely on the market for technoIogy (see Figure 2). 
Differences across chemicaI sub-sectors are remarkable as well. In the aggre-
gate, technology licensing is most common in sectors with large scale produc-
(4) The annual average number of plants constructed or under construction during the period 
under study is welJ above one thousand. Of these, half explicitly report the information 
about the licensor. Restricting attention to the latter, 494 plants per year were licensed in 
from unaffiliated sources. This figure multiplied by the average payments for a technology 
transaction in the chemical industry, $21.57 mi Ilion, gives the lower bound of our estimate 
in the text, $10 bilJion. The average payments for a technology transaction in chemicals 
have been computed using the SDC Joint Venture database, a commercial database provi-
ded by the Securities Data Corporation, and constructed from SEF filings (1 O-Qs), finan-
cial journals, news wire services, proxies and quarterly reports (see Arora et al., 2000. for 
additional details). 
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tion facilities, with relatively homogenous products, and with a large number 
of new plants. It is less common in sectors marked by product differentiation, 
custom tailoring of products for customers, and small scales of production. 
Indeed, in Pulp & Paper, Gas Handling, Fertilizers, Industrial Gases and 
Organic Refining more than 90 % of the plants involves the sale of technology 
between firms that are not linked through ownership ties, whereas in 
Pharmaceuticals, Organic Chemicals and Plastics the share is c10se to 50 %. 
FinalIy, the market for chemical technology is more prominent in large pro-
duct markets. As shown in Figure 3, the extent of the market for chemical tech-
nology moves from close to 90 % in 'large' product markets (those accounting 
for more than 30 plants worldwide during the period under study) to 50 % in 
'niche' product markets (1-2 plants). 
FIGURE 3 : Share of SEFs licensing by size of product markets 
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Contracts typically involve a lump sum payment that is paid in installments, 
starting when the contract is signed to when the plant is commissioned. In addi-
tion, there may be royalties on output for a specified period of time (royalties 
are more or less set by industry norms, typicalIy between 2 % and 5 %). These 
carry with them the right to audit, a right which is occasionaHy exercised. 
Specialized engineering firms tend to favor lump sum payments, unwilling or 
unable to track how the project does after commissioning. 
4. - SPECIALIZED ENGINEERING FIRMS AND DIVISION 
OFLABOR 
An important reason for the dramatic surge of licensing transactions after 
WWII has to do with the rise of specialized process design, engineering and 
construction firms (henceforth, SEFs). SEFs originated as an American pheno-
menon. From very early in this century, the oil firms used specialized sub-
contractors in various capacities : to procure or manufacture equipment such as 
pumps and compressors, valves, and heat exchangers, and to provide speciali-
zed sub-systems such as piping and the electrical systems. As these specialized 
engineering-construction firms grew in their ability to handle more sophistica-
ted tasks, process design became a part of their activities as well. By the 1960s, 
SEFs dominated the design and construction of new plants and were important 
sources of process innovation (Freeman, 1968 ; Mansfield el al., 1977). SEFs 
reaped the advantages of specialization. By working for many clients, they 
benefited from learning by doing, and by selling repeatedly their expertise 
(through licenses or engineering services) they could spread the cost of accu-
mulating that expertise over a larger output. 
The importance of the SEFs lies not only in the fact that they were sources 
of innovations but also in how they appropriated the rents from innovation. 
Lacking the downstream assets required to commercialize their innovations 
themselves, SEFs used licensing as the principal way of profiting from their 
innovations. Freeman (1968) showed that for the period 1960-66, SEFs as a 
group accounted for about 30 % of all licenses. During the 1980s the impor-
tance of SEFs as a source of technology has increased somewhat. Figure ) 
shows that in the last decade SEFs supplied the technology for more than one 
third of plant investments in the world as a whole, which implies that about 
45 % of aH technologies coming from unaffiliated sources were licensed by 
SEFs (5). 
With sorne prominent exceptions such as UOP and HalconlScientific Design, 
SEFs did not focus on breakthrough innovation. However, they did improve 
(5) The role of SEFs varies across different sub-sectors. For instance, in Pharmaceuticals, 
Plastics, and Agricultural Products, SEFs account for less than 10 % of all technologies 
from unaffiliated firms, compared to 60 % in sub-sectors like Fertilizers, and Textile and 
Fibers. 
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and modify processes deveJoped by chemicaJ firms and offer those for license. 
SEFs encouraged technology licensing in two other ways. First, as discussed 
below, they induced chemical firms to license their own technology. Second, 
they often acted as licensing agents for chemicals firms. Chemical producers 
often lack licensing experience and are unwilling to provide the various engi-
neering and design services that licensees need in addition to the technology, 
and therefore use SEFs as licensing agents. A chemical firm will license its 
technology to an SEF. The latter offers a complete technology package, consis-
ting of the core technology licensed from a chemical producer, along with 
know-how and installation and engineering services. This arrangement enables 
the Iicensor to benefit from the superior abiJity of SEFs to manage technology 
transfer. It also provides a buffer between the chemical firm and its licensees, 
limiting accidental leakage of information. From the point of view of the cus-
tomer, dealing with a single source for technology, construction and enginee-
ring reduces transaction costs. The SEF can also provide better operational 
guarantee than if the contract were apure technology licensing contract. (See 
Grindley and Nickerson, 1996, for further discussion of this topic). 
Interviews with industry executives have confirmed the important role of 
SEFs as integrators, bundling technology licensed from a technology supplier 
like UCC or BP, with engineering and procurement services. It appears that 
whereas established firms in the U.S. or Europe are more likely to negotiate 
directIy with the technology supplier, and then ask SEFs to bid for the engi-
neering and construction contract, chemical firms in developing countries rely 
very heavily on SEFs. For them, SEFs act like one-stop-shops, procuring tech-
nology and equipment, and providing engineering and construction services. 
Our data confirm this. In the 1980s, SEFs were more important sources of 
technology for small chemical companies and third world firms. For instance, 
large chemical companies from advanced countries (those with a turnover of 
more than $1 billion in 1988) purchased around a fifth of their technologies 
from SEFs. For smaller first world companies (with less than $1 bil1ion of tur-
nover in 1988) this percentage was 37 %, and close to 50 % for third world 
chemicaJ firms. See Figure 2. 
Finally, Figure 3 shows that SEFs accounted for a larger share of total licen-
sing in larger product markets. Furthermore, although not evident from the 
figure, larger markets aIso tend to have a Iarger fraction of the total investment 
from small firms and third world companies (6). In other words, the evidence 
is consistent with the notion that SEFs encourage investment, particularly by 
smaIJ firms and third world companies. 
(6) The market share of big chemical companies (Le. all firms with a turnover of more than 
$) billion in the year 1988) is 28 % in 'Iarge' product markets (more than 30 plants). whe-
reas it is about 45 % in 'niche' product markets (J -2 plants). 
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5. - LICENSING BY CHEMICAL FIRMS 
5.1. Empirical evidence 
The licensing activities of the SEFs have had a major effect on the rent appro-
priation strategies of the other players in the market as weH. In a marked depar-
ture from their pre-WWII strategy of closely holding onto their technology, a 
number of chemical and oil companies began to use licensing as an important 
(although not the only) mean s of profiting from innovation. Licensing by che-
mical producers is now a significant share of aH licensing in the industry. As 
Figure 1 shows, aIthough SEFs playa major role as licensors, at least half of 
the licenses sold to unaffiliated firms are by other chemical producers them-
selves. 
Table 1 shows the licensing strategies by a number of selected chemical cor-
porations from advanced countries, which were especially active as technology 
suppliers during the 1980s. In particular, the last three columns of the table 
report the share of licenses directed to the national market, to the rest of the 
first world and to the third world respectively. AH companies are more likely to 
use licensing in dealing with overseas investments, aIthough sorne firms (e.g. 
Union Carbide, Monsanto, Exxon) also license in their home markets. On ave-
rage, slight1y more than one in ten licenses goes to the national market. To put 
this in perspective, the weight of the national market vis-a-vis the world mar-
ket is also one tenth, implying that the bias towards international licensing is 
moderate. 
TABLE J : Licensing strategies by some selected chemical producers 
Company Turnover A B e D CID E F G 
Name 1988 
Air Liquide FRA 3539 129 45 233 120 l.94 0.12 0.36 0.52 
Monsanto USA 7453 113 31 204 590 0.35 0.26 0.22 0.52 
Union Carbide USA 8324 106 37 192 59 3.25 0.22 0.42 0.36 
Shell UK 11848 101 71 183 773 0.24 0.02 0.43 0.55 
rel UK 21125 93 55 168 1020 0.16 0.0 0.31 0.69 
Air Products USA 2237 59 29 107 72 1.48 0.19 0.24 0 .57 
Amoeo USA 4300 55 23 99,5 NA NA 0.18 0.40 0.42 
Phillips USA 2500 55 22 99,5 NA NA 0.1 6 0.40 0.44 
Rhone-Pou] ene FRA 10802 44 28 79,6 632 0.13 0.0 0.23 0.77 
Texaeo USA 1500 44 9 79,6 NA NA 0.18 0.32 0.50 
BASF GER 21543 37 45 66,9 1010 0.07 0 .03 0.49 0.48 
Exxon USA 9892 35 49 63,3 551 0.11 0 .23 0.37 0.40 
Mitsui Toatsu lAP 2991 35 15 63 ,3 NA NA 0.09 0.11 0.80 
Hoechst GER 2 1948 34 44 61 ,5 1363 0.05 0.03 0.3 0.94 
Du Pont USA 19608 33 66 59,7 1319 0.05 0.03 0.12 0.85 
AVERAGE 9974 65 38 117 683 023 0 .12 0 .32 056 
Note: A = total number of hcenses m 1980-90, B = total number of self licenses in 1980-90, e = Estimated annual 
average Iicensing revenues, D = R&D expenditures in ] 988, E = share of licenses al horne, F = share of licenses in 
the rest ofthe fust world, G = share oflicenses in the third world. AH figures (except shares) in millions ofUS 
dollars. 
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Not only do firms license extensively, many of them now explicitIy consider 
licensing revenues as a part of the overall return from investing in technology. 
For instance, Union Carbide is reported to have earned $300 miHion from its 
polyolefin licensing in 1992 (Grindley and Nickerson, 1996). More recentIy, 
both Du Pont and Dow, two chemical firms with a long tradition of exploiting 
technology in-house have indicated that they intend to license technology very 
actively. In 1994 Du Pont created a division with the specific task of overseeing 
all technology transfer activities. Reversing its tradition of treating in-house 
technology as the jewel of the crown, Du Pont has started to exploit it through 
an aggressive outlicensing programo Starting from 1999, this is expected to be 
a $100 million per year business. On its own web page, DuPont advertises the 
technologies available for licensing in several areas : fibers-related, compo-
sites, chemical science and catalysis, analytical, environmental, electronics, 
biological. The words of Jack Krol, DuPont's president and CEO, at the 1997 
Corporate Technology Transfer Meeting, emphasize this new trend : 
« ... For a long time, the belief about intellectual property at DuPont was that 
patents were for defensive purposes only. Patents and related know-how should 
not be sold, and licensing was a drain on internal resources ... Our businesses 
are gradually becoming more comfortable with the idea that aH intellectual pro-
perty ... is licensable for the right price in the right situation ... ». 
Dow has al so long had a reputation for « ... never licensing breakthrough tech-
nology, and there was an emotional bias against licensing ... » (Ed Gambrell, 
V.P., Dow). In 1995, it formed a licensing group with the purpose to « create 
more value » from its technology. Before the group was formed, Dow had 
licensing revenues of roughly $10-20 million per year. It now expects to earn a 
$100 millionlyear business by 2000. 
FinaHy, we have estimated the average annuallicensing revenues (during the 
period 1980-90) for a sample of large chemical producers. These revenues 
amount to $26 million, or about 10 % of the mean R&D expenditure in 1988 
(for our sample). Sorne firms are performing well aboye this average. For ins-
tance, Union Carbide has licensing revenues as large as its total R&D expen-
diture. Other firms like Monsanto, Shell and ICI cover respectively about 36 %, 
24 %, 17 % of their R&D expenditures through licensing revenues. In Table 1 
we report for a selected number of firms the annual average licensing revenues 
(column C) and their total R&D expenditures in 1988 (column D). 
5.2 Why is there so much licensing by chemical producers ? 
This behavior of the chemical firms runs contrary to the orthodox manage-
ment prescriptions (e.g. Teece, 1988). Traditional wisdom holds that licensing 
is undesirable because the innovator has to share the rents with the licensee, 
and because licensing implies increased competition and rent dissipation. 
There are two, related, reasons for the change in strategy : increased compe-
tition, and technology licensing by SEFs. The presence of competing techno-
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logies drasticalIy changes the payoff to the strategy of trying to keep one's 
technology in-house. For instance, suppose there are two viable processes for 
the production of a particular product, each owned by a different firmo If one 
of the firms is going to license out (seU) its technology, the best response of the 
other innovator may well be to license out (sell) as well. 
A recent search of the trade publications turned up further evidence that 
shows that at least in sorne markets, chemical and oil companies are aggressi-
vely competing to sell technology, often in collaboration with an SEF which 
undertakes the provision of the engineering and other know-how. Sometimes, 
competitors in the market for licenses are other chemical producers. In other 
cases, the major competition is provided by SEFs. 
In Arora and Fosfuri (1999) we develop a model of oligopolistic competition 
with potentially more than one technology supplier. We consider the case 
where at least one of the competing innovations is patented by an SEF. Lacking 
production facilities, an SEF has IiUle option but to Jicense its technology to 
others (7). Therefore, when one of the innovators is an SEF, the other innova-
tor's dominant strategy is to license its ¡nnovation as well. Put it differently, in 
product markets where SEFs are widespread, chemical producers have no other 
strategic choice, but aggressively licensing themselves. Figure 4 shows that in 
all chemical sub-sectors in which SEFs had more than 42 % of market share 
during the 1980s, the average number of licenses sold out by chemical produ-
cers was 2.8, whereas in the sub-sectors in which SEFs had less than 18 % of 
the market, it was as liule as 1.3 (8). 
Even without SEFs, a technology holder may license if the net licensing reve-
nues are greater than the loss in profits due to increased competition in the pro-
duct market. However, whereas the licensing revenues go only to the licensor, all 
incumbent producers potentialIy lose from the increased competition. In other 
words, licensing imposes a negative pecuniary externality upon other incum-
bents, which is not taken into account by the licensor. As a result, licensing can 
be privately profitable even if it reduces the joint profits of all incumbents. 
This is exemplified by the different ways in which BP Chemicals has approa-
ched acetic acid and polyethylene. In acetic acid, BP Chemicals has strong 
proprietary technology, but it licenses very selectively, typically only licensing 
to get access to markets it would otherwise be unable to entero By contrast, in 
polyethylene, BP has less than 2 % of the market share. Although it has good 
proprietary technology as well, there are a dozen other sources of technology 
(7) Our data confirm that the average number of licenses sold out by SEFs is larger than the 
average number of licenses sold out by producers in basically all chemical sub-sectors. 
(8) Figure 4 classifies aH chemical sub-sectors (23) reported in CAPF in three broad catego-
ries characterized respectively by smaH, medium and important presence of SEFs. It 
reports the average number of licenses per chemical producer. 
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FIGURE 4 : Market share of SEFs and licensing by chemical producen) 
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for rnaking polyethylene. Thus, BP has licensed its polyethylene technology 
very aggressively, competing with Union Carbide which was the market leader 
in licensing polyethylene technology. Even here, BP initially tried not to 
license in Westem Europe, where BP had a substantial share of polyethylene 
capacity. However, other licensors continued to supply technology to firms that 
wished to produce polyethylene in Westem Europe, with the result that BP 
found that it was losing potential Iicensing revenue without any benefits in the 
form of restraining entry. 
In Arora and Fosfuri (1999), we formally show that the more homogeneous 
the product, the greater the negative externality to other incumbents, and the 
greater the incentives to license. We find that technology licensing is most 
common in sectors with large scale production facilities, with relatively homo-
genous products, and with a large number of new plants. It is les s cornmon in 
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sectors marked by product differentiation, custom tailoring of products for cus-
tomers, and small scales of production. Figure 5 confirms this finding. It clas-
sifies all chemical sub-sectors reported in CAPF in three broad categories of 
product differentiation : homogenous, intermediate and differentiated. The 
figure shows that the average number of licenses per patent-holder increases as 
the product market becomes more homogenous (9). 
FinalIy, most of the licensing takes place for processes. New products are far 
less likely to be licensed, at least in the initial stage of their life cycles. In this 
case, the profit loss due to competition would be felt almost entirely by the 
licensor since by definition there would not be any other incumbent producers 
of the producto These incentives are reinforced by the unimportance of SEFs in 
product innovation. 
6. - WHY IN CHEMICALS ? 
Licensing and the presence of a market for technology are not limited to the 
chemical industry. In Arora, Fosfuri and Gambardella (2000) we provide evi-
dence of extensive licensing in sectors like semiconductors, electronics, indus-
trial machinery, equipment and business services, biotechnology, and several 
examples of licensing strategies by large established producers like IBM, Texas 
Instruments, Boeing, Philips, Procter & Gamble, General Electric. 
Nevertheless, it is true that the use of licensing as a strategy of rent appropria-
tion is less developed outside of chemicals, particularly for processes (see also 
Anand and Khanna, 1997). 
As discussed earlier, technology licensing may be hindered either because 
licensing contracts are very inefficient or because it is not in the strategic inter-
est of the technology holder to license the technology. Licensing contracts can 
be inefficient due to the need to transfer know-how and due to information 
asymmetries. Both are closely related to the strength of patent protection. 
In the chemical industry, unlike most others, chemical processes can be 
effectively protected through patents. As a result, even the valuable unpatented 
know-how, needed to use the technology, can be licensed. Patents pertain to 
that part of the discovery that is codified. Therefore the effectiveness of patents 
depends on how cheaply and effectively new ideas and knowledge can be arti-
culated in terms of universal categories. When innovations cannot be described 
(9) Our measure of product differentiation was computed as follows. CAPF classifies the che-
mical plants within each sub-sector in more disaggregated process technology classes. We 
use the counts al lhis disaggregated level to compute an equidistribution index at the sub-
sector level. Our index of product differentiation takes the value of O if the products are 
homogenous and the value of 100 if they are totally differentiated. We have also tried alter-
native measures of product differentiation. such as the entropy index and the Herfindahl 
index. with substantially similar results 
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in terms of universal and general categories, sensible patent law can only pro-
vide narrow patent protection. During the 1860s, when synthetic dyestuffs first 
appeared, their structure was poorIy understood, as were the reaction pathways 
and processes. Thus broad patents led to extensive litigation and retarded the 
development of technology. In France, an excessively broad patent on aniline 
red was construed to include all processes for making the red aniline based dye, 
even though it was quite clear that the structure of aniline dyes was as yet unk-
nown. There were long and bitter disputes in England about the validity of the 
Medlock patent for magenta (another aniline dye) that tumed on whether the 
appropriate definition of « dry » arsenic acid included the water of hydration 
(Travis, 1993 : 104-137). 
Arora and Gambardella (1994) point out that technological knowledge that is 
closely related to broad engineering principIes and physicaI and chemical 
« laws » is more readily codifiable. Chemical engineering developed more gene-
ral and abstract ways of conceptualizing chemical processes, initialIy in the form 
of unit operations, and later in terms of concepts such as mas s and energy trans-
fer. A number of different processes could be conceived of in terms of these more 
elementary units. A chemicaI engineer could therefore see common elements 
across a number of processes that might appear very different and diverse to a 
chemist from an earlier generation. Chemical engineering (and the concomitant 
developments in polymer science and surface chemistry) thus provided the lan-
guage for describing more precisely the innovations to be protected. 
In other words, patents work well in the chemical industry because the object 
of discovery can be described clearly in terms of formulae, reaction pathways, 
operating conditions and the like (e.g. Levin et al., 1987). But it is not merely 
that the object of discovery is more discrete in the sense of being a particular 
compound. Rather, it is the ability to relate the « essential » structure of the 
compound to its function. This allows a patent to include within its ambit ines-
sentí al variatíons in structure, as in minor modifications in side chains of a pes-
ticide (10). In fact, chemical patents frequentIy use Markush structures to 
define the scope of the claim (1 1). The use of Markush structures permits a suc-
cinct and compact description of the claims and allows the inventor to protect 
the invention for sets of related compounds without the expense (and tedium) 
of testing and listing the entire set. The ability to explicate the underlying 
scientific basis of the innovation allows the scope of the patent to be delimited 
more clearly. The obvious extensions can be foreseen more easily and descri-
bed more compactly. 
(lO) In sorne instances, seerningly rninor variations in side chains can have significant biologi-
cal effects. Therefore. what is a « rninor }) variation is itself determined by the state of the 
current understanding of the relation between structure and funclion. 
( 11) A Markush structure is best underslood as a language for specifying chemical structures 
of cornpounds. which allows generic representation for an emire set of related cornpounds. 
See Maynard and Peters (1991 : 71) for details. 
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7. - CONCLUSIONS 
We have argued that there exists a functioning market in chemicals where 
process technologies are sold through arm's length license contracts. We have 
documented the substantial extent of technology licensing in the chemical 
industry, involving both specialized engineering firms and chemical producers 
themselves. The existence of this market for technology has contributed to a 
faster worldwide diffusion of the chemical technology and to make the chemi-
cal industry a truly global industry. This process has pro gres sed to the point 
where licensing is an integral part of the technology strategies of even the lar-
gest chemical firms. 
Such widespread licensing would be unlikely without a weIl-functioning 
patent system : transaction costs involved in contracting for technology would 
be larger and contracts for know-how less efficient. Although further research 
is needed, we believe that patents have worked well in the chemicaI industry 
because the underlying knowledge base - chemistry and chemical engineering 
- has been very successful in clarifying the relationship between structure and 
function. A chemical invention can be described clearly in terms of structure, 
reaction pathways, or operating conditions, with a reasonably clear sense of the 
limits of the invention. 
While patents are necessary for a market for technology, they are by no 
means sufficient. Firms that specialize in the design, engineering and construc-
tíon of chemical plants emerged and sorne developed proprietary technologies 
that they offered for license, at a time when many firms, all over the world, 
were looking to acquire chemical technologies. SEFs induced chemical firms 
to license their technology as well. In addition, SEFs reduced transaction costs 
by acting as licensing agents for chemical firms and by bundling technology 
with complementary engineering, design and construction capabilities valuable 
to potential buyers of technology. The presence of SEFs, induced entry by a 
number of firms, increasing the number of potential technology buyers. The net 
result was a « thicker » and a more efficient market for technology. 
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